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Abstract
While electronic medical records have the potential to vastly improve a patient’s health care, their introduction
also raises new and complex security and privacy issues. The challenge of preserving what patients’ believe as
their privacy in the context of the introduction of the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR),
into the multi-layered and decentralised Australian health system is discussed. Based on a number of European
case studies the paper outlines the institutional measures for privacy and security that have been put in place,
and compares them with the current status in Australia. The implementation of the PCEHR has not been as
straight forward, holistic or as uniform as in the European countries’ studied. This has meant that issues
around personal privacy and security have not been addressed in an effective and functional manner.
Surprisingly, the researchers found that the patient is absent in the PCEHR privacy and security discussion;
and their perceptions of, and requirements for privacy and secure management of their medical information is
absent. The concept of personal privacy and security has yet to be fully explored from the patient’s perspective,
despite it being a Personally Controlled Health Record.
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INTRODUCTION
The application of information technology to medicine is not new, with General Practitioners (GPs) adopting
electronic medical records as early as the mid-1980s (Mahncke & Williams, 2006). Similarly, the keeping of
electronic records within the business and the management of individual’s personal finances is well established.
Online banking has been available since the late 1980s and took off in the mid 1990’s with the advent of the
web-based banking. Data is accessed electronically via pin numbers, cards and web pages (“Canstar: onlinebanking history,” 2012). Health information could be considered to be far more sensitive than other personal
data, but as retail outlets and retailer loyalty programs have demonstrated for years, that people are willing to
disclose some personal information in return for perceived tangible benefits. The concept of disclosure in return
for better treatment could be applied to health data as well (‘Health IT Exchange: Building patient trust in EHRs
can’t be about security,” 2010). With the benefits of shared and accessible health information there is always a
price in relation privacy and security (Rynning, 2007).
The disclosure of personal medical information highlights the issues of trust and its role in relation to the
privacy and security of electronic health records (EHRs) that are far more complex because there are multiple
parties involved. A simple way to view trust is as a willingness to take risk (the risk in this case comes from one
party making themselves vulnerable to the actions of another based on the expectation that the other party will
behave in the way desired by the trusting party). It is suggested that context is also essential, where trust is a
three-part concept, involving a truster, a trustee, and a purpose or scope to which the relationship applies (Baier,
1986; Hardin, 1993). In the case of EHRs, the patient makes themselves vulnerable to the clinicians by
disclosing personal medical information trusting that it will be managed in an appropriate manner. The context
of trust has become more complex due to the introduction of digital information and the potential
interoperability and of records (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2007).
If the technical security issues are not addressed in a way that patients understand and accept them, then it is
possible the patient will lose confidence and trust in the EHR system. This lack of trust may lead to patients not
providing information in an attempt to preserve their privacy, thus affecting the integrity of the stored data and
potentially leading to life-threatening situations such as inappropriate medication (Alhaqbani and Fidge, 2007).
It is suggested by Jacques (2011), that in order for patients to have a greater level of control over their privacy
they should be allowed to opt into the EHR system or at least flag and restrict sensitive information.
Coles-Kemp and Kani-Zabihi (2011) suggest that an individual’s interaction with any online information system
is multilayered in nature; there is the physical, informational, personal and communal layers. The physical and
information layers usually provide privacy protection. Their study highlighted the divide between the person and
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the institutional system with which they interact. Previously interactions with institutions have been conducted
on a face to face basis, however with the advent of technology there has been a shift to the use of a digital
interface instead of a personal one (Coles-Kemp & Kani-Zabihi, 2011).
With the introduction of EHRs, an additional set of players and factors have entered the equation such as
electronic security protocols on EHR systems, privacy legislation, government protocols and electronic
interchange of patient data. There is a disconnect between institutional systems for the privacy and security of
EHRs and the patient’s perceived personal security and privacy of information stored on EHRs. The lack of
integration between institutional and personal requirements for privacy and security is illustrated in figure 1
below.
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Figure 1 - Institutional and personal requirements for privacy

Privacy and Security Issues in Electronic Health Record Systems
While much of the recent attention on EHRs has been on the establishment and integration of computer systems,
little attention has been paid to privacy and security in the health context. From a technical standpoint patients
have voiced their concerns about their medical records being stored and used in electronic form citing issues
including loss, theft, and misuse of what they consider private and personal information. It has been suggested
that the emphasis on privacy and security in EHR systems as a requirement for building consumer trust in these
systems. The reliance on institutional security controls, underestimates the importance of the provider-to-patient
relationship in the formation of trust. According to a review by Tejero and de la Torre (2011) the weaknesses if
the EHRs they reviewed included a lack of interoperability, a supporting legal framework yet to be established,
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sensitive information that is not protected, the reliance on the physicians for EHR adoption and the risk of data
theft and phishing.
Moving from a paper file to an electronic record means that information is no longer physical but digital and
therefore can more easily be moved. Once all a patient’s information was kept in a paper base file in a clinic or
hospital, held in what was presumed a secure location. It could be suggested that the patient’s trust was placed in
the institution or practice in which the paper file was held. Now given the complexity and portability of current
electronic systems, it is unrealistic to think patients would be able to learn or understand the technical
information about EHR systems, let alone have the level of understanding that the providers or hospitals or
insurance companies use (‘Health IT Exchange: Building patient trust in EHRs can’t be about security,” 2010).
Without a detailed understanding of the system it is unlikely that patients would be able to make an independent
determination as to whether the privacy and security measures afforded by such a system are sufficient to make
them confident that their personal health data is protected. Instead, most people will rely on their doctors or
other providers (the actual users of the EHR systems), and their relative comfort level with digitising their health
records will likely be strongly correlated to the level of trust they put in their providers (Health IT Exchange:
Building patient trust in EHRs can’t be about security, 2010).
Measures to Address Privacy and Security Issues in the Australian Context
Showell (2011) contends that Australians will have had little prior exposure to policy issues of privacy, consent
and secondary use, and may feel that they have not been adequately consulted. Mistrust, scepticism and caution
may lead to resistance to the introduction and uptake of the EHR system, and result in a reiteration of adverse
views which may already have been addressed effectively. To achieve a completely operational EHR platform,
security and privacy problems have to be resolved, due to the importance of the data included within these
records. But given all the different methods to address security and privacy, they still remain in most cases as an
open issue (Showell, 2011).
As early as 2006 the Australian Privacy Foundation, flagged the privacy risks inherent in any system of EHRs to
include poor security where patients and unauthorised people may be able to access the patient’s records leading
to inappropriate access to records and theft of personal data. For example, the unauthorised exchange of
information with other health care providers such as pharmaceutical companies; and the use of a consolidated
health record by a patient’s employer or insurance company for discriminative employment practices. Those
responsible for designing EHR systems should ensure that these risks be minimised as much as possible, by
using the best technology, legal safeguards, policies, procedures, and training. Specifically, patient education
was not addressed in these recommendations (Australian Privacy Foundation, 2006).
The changes to health care system and the move to personally controlled health records has reframed patients as
‘consumers’, with an assumption that they have a consumer’s right to select and choose in the health
marketplace and are participants in the development of their e-health record. There is little evidence of direct
citizen involvement in the discourse about the EHR, or about health identifiers. Neither is there much visible
evidence of widespread public discussion or debate about the policy issues, or evidence that the general public
has any working knowledge of the proposed EHR system, and how it will operate in practice (Showell, 2011).
The recommendations from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) in 2006 addressed patients’ privacy
concerns and suggested the following measures; an opt-in consent model, a multi-layered approach to consent,
consumer control over access to their health information, capacity to mask sensitive information, elimination of
regulatory complexity and uncertainty, and some control over secondary uses of health information. At this
time, the OPC warned against forming a view of the ‘normal consumer’. An individuals’ perception of how their
health information is handled is personal and subjective, and systems need the flexibility to accommodate
people holding different views about how much of their own health information should be confidential
(Consumer’s Health Forum, 2006).
Yet six years after original concerns were raised around privacy and security, it would seem little has been done.
According to recent media reports by the Australian Broadcasting Cooperation and, associations such as the
Australian Medical Association (AMA), the privacy issues mentioned above are yet to be tackled. Medical
experts have highlighted some of the risks as Australia moves into a system of EHRs. Doctors are warning it is
vital to ensure personal records do not become compromised, as the range of electronic devices available for
access grows. The system needed to be secure whether used from a personal computer, tablet or smart phone
and there was concern that unauthorised people might access someone else's notes, if devices were left open or
accessible.
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Launch of the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) System in Australia
Australia has a two-tiered government system (state and federal) that is responsible for the delivery of health
services. An additional layer of complexity is the presence of a large private health sector which is not directly
under the government’s control. In Australia, individual general practices have implemented EHR systems, with
no patient input. The implementation of such systems in hospitals and general practices has been very piece
meal with no uniformity or consistency as adoption was driven by information technology (IT) vendors. The
Australian government considered that the introduction of personally controlled electronic health records would
enable people to take a more active role in managing their health and making informed decisions (National
Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, 2009). This belief led the government to establish the PCEHR
launched on 1 July 2012.
Australians can now choose to register for their own personally controlled eHealth record. An eHealth record is
an electronic summary of an individual’s key health information. Initially an eHealth record will contain basic
information. As the system develops, healthcare providers will be able to add more information like treatments,
medications and allergies. Individuals can control their own eHealth record, by choosing to restrict which
health care provider organisations can access it and what information is included. Patients can volunteer to join
the system (via the department's website), which stores all their health information, including test results and
prescriptions, in a national database. It is the first time patients will be able to access their medical details.
Since the launch of the PCEHR, only 5,029 people have joined the federal government's controversial $466
million eHealth system. Figures obtained from the Department of Health and Ageing has shown each individual
to take up the PCEHR has so far cost the government $92,662 (Molloy, 2012). The slow uptake had been
predicted in May, and confirmed soon after the online database commenced. A month later, glitches were
revealed with the system.
Implementation of Electronic Health Records in Europe- Selected cases
The implementation of EHRs in Europe has a significantly longer history than in Australia. Generally, the
European countries that have had communist or socialist governments have a more centralised health system
with tighter government controls. This has made the link between legislation, clinicians and IT vendors more
effective in delivering a secure and trusted EHR system. Case studies were conducted during 2010-2011 to
investigate the process of implementation of EHRs in three selected European countries, Finland, Norway and
Slovenia. The interviews were conducted with the clinicians; government and IT vendors. The findings
collected have been summarised around the themes of privacy and security.
The Characteristics of the European System
The research found that in each case a considerable legislative framework had been put in place prior to the
implementation of an EHR system, to support information security and patient privacy. The legislation included
penalties for non-compliance and privacy breaches. Due to the centralised government system and health
infrastructure, uniform processes were established at all levels of the health system. As a result, IT system
specifications have been developed and built into the IT to address privacy and security issues. In fact, one of
the respondents stated “The data is actually more secure than when we had medical data on paper, as there was
no tracking when and who accessed the data. Now we have electronic records, any access to the data can be
tracked” (Medical Administrator, Slovenia). In Slovenia, the Information Commissioner reviews the security of
personal data held by medical providers on the EHRs. In fact, the respondents’ organisation had been reviewed
by the Information Commissioner three weeks prior to the interview and had received recommendations on
areas of security upgrade.
The health agency known as Kela in Finland, has been running some form of electronic demographic database
for the past 50 years. As part of the development of a single national health database, rules have been developed
as to who can access what part of the data. The management of medical records is based on each document
being considered as to what should be put on the common record. Guidelines as to who can have access to what
information are held on each file, and which medical professionals can see what.
Security has not proved an issue in Norway, as there have been no incidences of identity theft, and criminals
generally have no interest in what is stored on a patient’s EHRs. Patients cannot access their records at this point
in time, except in the Doctor’s office or via a bedside terminal. According to one interviewee, the records are
written for the Doctor’s requirements, not for the patients’ needs and hence could be misinterpreted if the patient
was to view the record without a practitioner being present.
The downside of the highly centralised health systems in Europe is the direct intervention by ministers and law
makers. According to one respondent in Finland, “one of the risks is Parliamentary involvement and influence
in the process, is that laws can be changed to enable people to be profiled through the system.” Although
12

significant institutional safe guards have been put in place in the health systems examined, the major source of
risk is not electronic but human. One of the risks identified is poor practices around the input of management
and data by clinicians, as exemplified by the following comment “If the Doctors do not like it then they do not
use it and the system will not work. A poor interface will not be used and this will leave both Doctors and
patients without information.” The more people that access the system, the higher the security risk and the
demands from a wide range of system users often makes it difficult to develop a standard format for the EHR.
Despite electronic records being part of the medical system for over 20 years, there is still a human resource
issue. A health administrator in Slovenia stated that ”the major resource issue is the lack of people who have
skill and experience in health informatics as under the current scheme people are not a priority”. Without skilled
people the EHR systems will not function.
From the data collected, the European system had the advantage of a more centralised implementation process
for EHRs. The advantages of this are a consistent legislative framework and practices around patient
information privacy and security, relatively standardised IT systems and information management practices.
Despite this uniformity, none of the three countries investigated has yet established a national interoperable
EHRs database.
Current Status in Australia
Laws relating to health information privacy at the state and federal government level in Australia
In order to provide a legislative framework for the management of patient information, the Australian
government is proposing to introduce the ‘Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012’ (PCEHR
Act), establishing the personally controlled electronic health (eHealth) record system and provides for its
regulatory framework. Under the proposed Act will give the Information Commissioner (the Commissioner) the
power to investigate alleged contraventions of the Act and pursue enforcement mechanisms that are appropriate
in the circumstances of the case (Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, [OAIC], 2012).
The AMA in its submission to the Department of Health and Ageing expressed the need to ensure that only
people who have a genuine need and are authorised to do so are entitled to access a person’s PCEHR. The
legislation should also set out the framework under which the PCEHR system operator will function and the
requirements on the repository operators. The regulatory burden of the PCEHR on medical practitioners should
be kept to an absolute minimum (OAIC, 2011). The Australian government has allowed doctors to be
compensated for the extra work involved in supporting the system, in recognition of the additional time required
to maintain EHRs (Australian Medicine, 2012).
Another parallel issue raised with the advent of electronic records is the level of patient access. Once paper
health records were held by the clinician and rarely viewed by the patient. Now with PCEHRs, issues have been
raised by about the level of patient access and understanding. From the case studies carried out in Europe
clinicians expressed concerns around the complexity of data being stored in the EHRs and rarely are patients
allowed to access their records without a clinician present to interpret the data. It not just the relationship
between the EHR system in place and the patient, the clinician plays a mediating role between the system and
the patient (‘Health IT Exchange: Building patient trust in EHRs can’t be about security,” 2010).

CONCLUSION
A common feature across the implementation of EHRs is the disregard of the patient’s needs and understanding
of privacy and security of their personal medical details. In Australia, legal and technical infrastructure is being
put into place, as in the European countries examined. A patient’s understanding of EHRs has yet to be
addressed, as highlighted in a recent study in the United Kingdom where it was found that over 50% of patients
would withhold information to their health care provider due to privacy concerns. So no matter how stringent
the privacy and security measures, the accuracy of the data and its eventual usefulness are based on the patient’s
trust in the EHR (FairWarning, 2011).
For the PCEHR to be successfully implemented there needs to be education and promotion of EHRs of their
intended and permitted uses and benefits, and also the ways in which personal health data is protected against
loss, theft, misuse, and unauthorised disclosure. The best way to deliver these messages is to leverage the
(hopefully) trusting relationship that already exists between patients and providers, since from the patient
perspective, their doctors are much more likely to take on patient interests as their own than EHR software
vendors, insurance companies, or even government health agencies (‘Health IT Exchange: Building patient trust
in EHRs can’t be about security,” 2010).
The point is not to down-grade the importance of having strong privacy and security protections for health data
stored in EHR systems, but instead to reiterate that patient trust (or lack thereof) in health IT cannot be provided
through technical means alone. Patients may not know how their medical records are stored (paper files,
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computer, or some combination) or the physical, technical, or administrative measures in place to secure them.
With the prospect of easier and more frequent sharing of health data enabled by EHR systems, patients may
have less control over how their records are being handled. Well informed patients who trust in the privacy and
security of their health records would seem to be a prerequisite for the effective implementation of EHRs.
Without this the benefits to themselves, their health care providers, and the health care system will not be
realised.
The PCEHR is only beneficial as the patient information it contains. The EHR will be compromised if the
patient chooses to withhold vital information due to privacy and security concerns. Thus lowering the clinicians
trust when the record is viewed in a different health setting such as an emergency department. While the
Australian federal government has sought to tackle the technological and now legal issues surrounding privacy
and security, the PCEHR could fail if its target audience; the patient fails to opt in.
Considering the relatively low uptake of the PCEHR to date, it would suggest that there is a low level of
acceptance of and trust in EHRs. Further research could be conducted around patients’ privacy and security
needs and how best these can be met in the implementation of the PCEHR. Unlike Europe with its centralised
implementation, consistent legislative and administrative framework and history of national EHRs, Australia has
many more obstacles to overcome for the successful implementation of EHRs.
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